Listar por autor "Ferrés, Daniel"

Mostrando ítems 1-6 de 6

    • Capital structure under collusion 

      Ferrés, Daniel; Ormazabal, Gaizka; Povel, Paul; Sertsios, Giorgio (Elsevier, 2021)

    • Capital structure under collusion 

      Ferrés, Daniel; Ormazabal, Gaizka; Povel, Paul; Sertsios, Giorgio (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2016)
      We study the financial leverage of firms that collude by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage ratios during collusion periods, consistent with the idea that reductions in ...

    • Pobreza, educación y salarios en América Latina 

      Borraz, Fernando; Cabrera, José María; Cid, Alejandro; Ferrés, Daniel; Miles, Daniel (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2010)

    • Supermarket entry and the survival of small stores 

      Borraz, Fernando; Dubra, Juan; Ferrés, Daniel; Zipitría, Leandro (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2013)
      We analyze the effect of supermarket entry on the exit of small stores in the food retailing sector in Montevideo between 1998 and 2007. We use detailed geographical information to identify the ...

    • Whistleblowers on the board? The role of independent directors in cartel prosecutions 

      Campello, Murillo; Ferrés, Daniel; Ormazabal, Gaizka (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2017)
      Stock market reactions to news of cartel prosecutions are muted when indicted firms have a high proportion of independent directors serving on their boards. This finding is robust to self-selection and is more pronounced ...

    • Whistleblowers on the board? The role of independent directors in cartel prosecutions 

      Campello, Murillo; Ferrés, Daniel; Ormazabal, Gaizka (Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía, 2015)
      Stock market reactions to news of cartel prosecutions are muted when indicted firms have a highproportion of independent directors serving on their boards. This finding is robust to self-selectionand is more pronounced ...